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Abstract 
 
Threats to our nation’s resources and forces are becoming increasingly lethal and 
mobile.  Therefore, our ability to locate and interdict these threats is more important than 
ever.  Search theory is one tool that is vital to countering the increasing threat.  This 
research presents a multi-agent simulation, built around the allied search for U-boats in 
the Bay of Biscay during World War II, which extends several classic search theory 
algorithms.  Comparison of techniques is based on the effectiveness of finding high-
valued, mobile assets.  A JAVA-based multi-agent simulation model is designed, built 
and tested, and used to demonstrate the existence of differing emergent behaviors 
between search patterns currently used by the United States military. 
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SEARCH THEORY AND U-BOATS 
 
IN THE BAY OF BISCAY 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 General Issue 
 
 
Given the relative increase in military weapons lethality and mobility during 
World War II, it became clear to the allies that they needed to invest scientific effort into 
the process of search.  From this effort arose the concept of search as a unique organism, 
possessing its own structural properties and obeying its own physical laws.  Nowhere 
were the consequences of studying search more critical than the battle of the seas.  Prior 
to World War II, references to search theory in the scientific literature were scarce.  Since 
that time, the volume of published material on the subject would fill many bookshelves. 
To date, most search theory study has focused either on analytical models of 
specific situations requiring rigid assumptions, or, as in the case of search and rescue, 
operational experiments aimed at obtaining detection probabilities for a variety of 
scenarios.  Analytical search theory results provide bounds on empirical results.  This 
research introduces an agent-based simulation approach to the subject of offensive search 
operations in combat.  Generally, the value of combat simulation is measured in terms of 
insights gained through experimentation.  Agent-based simulation enables insights with 
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regards to the emergent behavior of the individual combatants, groups of combatants, or 
the system as a whole.  Emergent behavior for the purposes of this research is system 
behavior, not explicitly programmed, arising from local interactions between agents.  
Such behavior with respect to search effectiveness is investigated within the context of a 
historical case study involving offensive search. 
1.2 Background 
 
The U-boat war from World War II provides a valuable case study for the 
application of search theory in that detailed analyses on this long-lasting facet of the great 
conflict is not only available, but can be verified historically.  The allies, most notably the 
British, given the geographical fact that the island of Great Britain was highly dependent 
upon merchant shipping for much-needed supplies, were greatly concerned about 
effectively countering the U-boat threat.  If unchecked in the North Atlantic, U-boats had 
the ability to impart potentially crippling losses to international shipping.  One location 
with a particularly high concentration of U-boats was the Bay of Biscay, through which 
U-boats transited between occupied French ports and the North Atlantic.  The U-boats 
were most vulnerable during their Bay transits due to the coastal constraints of England 
and Ireland to the North and Spain to the South. 
British allied command realized that conducting effective airborne offensive 
search operations in the Bay could hold the key to offsetting the threat.  The allies 
combined analytical insights, operational experience, and intelligence information to 
form a basic search patrol methodology applied in the Bay of Biscay to include the first 
offensive search pattern—barrier patrol search.  Since it was believed that aircraft 
maximized sighting distance by approaching at 45 degrees to U-boat tracks, this search 
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pattern involved running NW-SE and NE-SW across some assigned coverage area 
(U-boats generally maintained east-westerly transit routes to cross the Bay). 
1.3 The Problem 
 
Little, if any, work has quantitatively examined differences between search 
patterns in airborne offensive search scenarios.  The search and rescue community has 
defined several separate search patterns from which a selection is made depending upon 
the situation at hand, five of which can be adapted for the offensive search situation 
evident during the U-boat war.  The Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) 
sponsored this research as part of an ongoing interest to study the virtue of possible 
emergent behaviors in agent-based combat simulation.  Given the insights gained to date 
from agent-based simulation in a wide variety of disciplines, it is proposed that search 
theory be re-examined within an agent-based framework.  An agent-based model 
representing the U-boat war was built to determine whether or not variations in the search 
pattern alone impact search efficiency, all else being equal. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The objective of this research is to develop and employ a methodology for 
empirically quantifying the effects of different search patterns on search efficiency.  Part 
of this process involves developing an object-oriented simulation in JAVA.  There are 
many advantages to utilizing an agent-based approach here, not the least of which are that 
many random processes evident in the scenario will be well represented and that “agents” 
have independent goals, resources, and threads of execution. 
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1.5 Scope of Research 
 
 This research focuses on multiple searchers seeking to detect multiple targets 
within the context of the historical scenario described herein.  Agent and simulation 
design data was compiled according to the following hierarchy:  1) historical fact as 
found directly from sources credited to allied and German participants; 2) published 
studies directly related to the offensive search in the Bay; 3) data derived from raw 
numbers in one or more of the preceding sources; and 4) good judgment (operational 
expertise) when the three previous sources fail or contradict one another.  Also regarding 
design data, we must mention that a special debt of gratitude is owed Dr. Brian McCue 
whose insights and historical materials related to search theory and the U-boat war were 
invaluable.  By maintaining statistical similarity with regards to U-boat density in the Bay 
and the number of hours flown by search aircraft, the problem of measuring search 
efficiency using separate search patterns is reduced to observing differences in the 
average number of U-boats sighted per month. 
1.6 Contribution of Research 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of using different search patterns on 
search efficiency have yet to be quantified, other than notionally.  This study provides 
background on search theory and describes a JAVA model used to assess the impact 
different search patterns have on U-boat sightings.  Our hope is that readers will see that 
the structure of search itself can have a direct impact on desired outcomes, perhaps in 
ways not ostensibly intuitive (i.e., emergent behaviors through agent-based simulation).  
Military operations that stand to benefit from airborne offensive search pattern analysis 
include drug interdiction, broad area searches for arms control treaty violations, and 
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hunting for mobile scud missile launchers, terrorist combat groups, smugglers, and 
opposing forces in rugged terrain.
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Agent-Based Simulation 
 
“’The real voyage of discovery,’ noted Marcel Proust, ‘lies not in finding new 
landscapes, but in having new eyes.’  This thought drives our interest in the nonlinear 
sciences and their relationship to the profession of arms” (Hoffman and Horne, 
1998:preface).  General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the United States Marine 
Corps, penned these words underscoring the importance of studying the intangibles of 
warfare with emergent non-classical methods.  One such method involves the use of 
software “agents” within the framework of statistical simulation. 
2.1.1 Applications of Agents. 
 
An agent is an entity, real or virtual, that perceives and acts in its environment 
(Russell and Norvig, 1995:7).  Specifically, an agent is characterized as a physical or 
virtual entity having a partial representation of its environment which is capable of 
perceiving that environment in some limited sense and acting within it; agents can 
interact with other agents, and have a set of internal tendencies or goals that guide their 
behavior in an attempt to satisfy these goals given its resources, abilities, and perceptions 
(i.e., autonomous; adapted from Ferber, 1999).  The concept of “software agents” is 
therefore derived from examining this definition of agents within the context of software 
development.  Recently, much attention has been given to agent-based simulation in an 
attempt to identify emergent behaviors and adaptations that are likely to result from agent 
interaction within the context of simulation.  Thus, the utility of agent-based simulation 
goes far beyond applications in the profession of arms to such disciplines as the social 
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sciences (see Bonabeau, 2002).  Professionals from many disciplines are interested in 
gaining insight into how cooperative and competitive agent behavior affects a real-world 
system (the whole versus the sum of the parts) and whether or not individual agent 
behavior has changed as a result.  
This characteristic of … analyzing the interaction systems that exist 
between agents is what distinguishes multi-agent systems from the more 
classical systemic approaches, in that preference is given to emergence, 
and action and interaction are considered as the motor elements in the 
structuring of a system taken as a whole.”  (Ferber, 1999:4-5) 
 
Further, unlike the majority of literature emphasizing cooperative agents, combat agents 
are designed to purposefully compete with elements (i.e., other combat agents) that seek 
to prevent them from attaining their goals.  The notion of such “antagonistic interaction” 
can certainly be analyzed as a possible “interaction system” mentioned above. 
Clearly, military leaders seek to understand the nature of combat at any level that 
might offer an opportunity to ultimately better influence the outcome of such conflict.  
Few educational opportunities are better suited toward this motive than the study of  
historical military conflict about which a great many facts have already been recorded 
and analyzed.  Such situations present a source against which new methods to observe 
and describe combat behavior can be compared.  The international conflict arguably most 
responsible for the birth of the discipline of operations research was the U-boat war of 
World War II (Morse and Kimball, 1954:3).  The wealth of data and analyses that exist 
regarding the U-boat conflict makes it an ideal benchmark. 
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2.2 Operational Context for Analysis; Hunting U-boats in World War II 
 
The main objectives of operations research were originally defined as the 
"prediction of the effects of new weapons and tactics" (Waddington, 1973:26).  One of 
the chief concerns for the allies in World War II was how to effectively counter the 
U-boat threat.  Once in the North Atlantic, U-boats imparted terrible losses to 
international shipping; Hitler himself stated, “U-boats will win the war” (Waddington, 
1973:38).  The degree of concern held by the allies was perhaps best stated by British 
Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill when he said, “the only thing that ever really 
frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril” (Churchill, 1949:598).  One such 
U-boat location was the Bay of Biscay in which captured French ports were used to stage 
U-boat operations against allied shipping in the North Atlantic.  The U-boats were most 
vulnerable when transiting the Bay of Biscay either embarking from or returning to their 
ports on the west coast of France.  British allied command was the first to realize that 
conducting effective offensive search operations in the Bay could play an important role 
in terms of offsetting the threat. 
The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command formed the Operational Research 
Section (ORS) early in the war; a body of scientists expected to work closely with 
military high command, the first duties of which involved analyzing the U-boat situation.  
ORS addressed various aspects of the anti-U-boat campaign, not all of which involved 
anti-submarine tactics in the Bay.  Rather, the original organization of ORS into four 
groups testified to the ubiquitous approach taken to counter the U-boat threat. 
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Those groups were: 
• Anti-U-boat operations; 
• Anti-shipping operations, photo reconnaissance operations, and weapons; 
• Planned flying and maintenance; and 
• Weather and navigation. (Waddington, 1973:19) 
In view of the large area of operations involved as well as the technology and 
platforms available at the time, it was determined that search operations for U-boats 
could only effectively take place either in the Bay of Biscay or near allied merchant 
convoys.  Beyond the Bay, the North Atlantic simply involved too much area in which a 
U-boat could hide, curtailing the ability of allied aircraft to find them.  The Bay itself 
constituted 130,000 square miles of searchable area, and extended from the northern 
coast of Spain in the South to the coast of France in the East on to England and Ireland in 
the North.  Allied search effort was applied both to convoys and to the Bay. 
Operations research efforts began by analyzing various raw data sets with the 
intent to form predictive and explanatory models.  Enemy patterns of behavior were 
identified; an amalgam of ORS insights, operational experience, and intelligence 
information produced a basic search patrol methodology applied in the Bay of Biscay 
(HBMSO, 1943:98-101).  Aircraft on patrol flew to a specific bearing and covered a 
predefined area extending from the bearing for a fixed number of hours.  The state of the 
weather, the number of hours of daylight, and the range of the aircraft regulated the 
duration of each patrol; therefore, patrol durations were not laid down in a hard and fast 
manner (even though they were technically fixed).  Repeated coverage of an area was not 
only possible, but often occurred.  Though the patrol area was marked on a chart, the 
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“essence of the problem” was for the navigator to find the area and keep the aircraft 
within search limits. 
 
Figure 1.  Briefing for an Anti-Submarine Patrol (HBMSO, 1943:100) 
 
It was discovered early on that aircraft maximized sighting distance by 
approaching at 45 degrees to U-boat tracks.  Therefore, most search patterns ran either 
NW-SE or NE-SW across some assigned coverage area since they generally assumed 
east-westerly transit routes for U-boats crossing the Bay.  Analyses also revealed that the 
U-boat distribution for 1942 and 1943 in the Bay could be modeled as a Poisson field, 
even though the U-boats began to employ "pack tactics" in September of 1943.  Pack 
tactics involved the grouping of at least two U-boats, both to increase their ability to 
protect each other by increasing the number of available lookouts and anti-aircraft guns, 
and to increase their lethality to merchant shipping convoys.  Such tactics did not appear 
to affect U-boat distribution to the point that it warranted further analysis, so this 
distributional assumption continued to hold (Waddington, 1973:235). 
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With regard to a specific search pattern, RAF Coastal Command had instituted 
use of a “crossover barrier patrol system” for search aircraft shortly before the war.  
Barrier patrols yielded the best distribution of flights—uniformly spaced parallel sweeps 
that allowed searching aircraft to always remain at an acute angle relative to the U-boat 
tracks (see Figure 2 below).  As it happens, operations research analysts later determined 
that track spacing could be chosen arbitrarily without an effect on search efficiency 
(though it was said that track spacing might have had an effect on the amount of search 
resources used) (Koopman, 1999:204-205), (OASG, 1977:142-164). 
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of Crossover Barrier Patrol System (Koopman, 1999) 
 
Aircraft that actually attacked a U-boat were not available for search effort 
elsewhere during that sortie as all weapons were expended in hopes of damaging or 
destroying the target.  Aircraft flying search patrols almost always flew alone, and during 
a sortie in which an aircraft had sighted a U-boat and dropped weapons in hopes of 
damaging or sinking the craft, the aircraft would have maintained area presence for 
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purposes of battle damage assessment (BDA).  Most search aircraft were equipped with a 
camera for BDA, and were keenly interested in sighting such things as survivors, surface 
debris, secondary explosions, oil slicks, or even sustained streams of bubbles.  Even so, 
BDA was difficult, and the aircrew only knew for sure whether or not the U-boat had 
sunk if survivors were recovered (HBMSO, 1943:98-101). 
After aircraft involved in the sighting and attack of U-boats returned to base, the 
aircrew debriefings were “searching and severe.”  Statistics for different patrols were 
used to keep track of the routes followed by U-boats although it was pointed out that 
timing of patrols was far too stereotyped (Waddington, 1973:235-236). 
2.3 Search Theory Concepts, Terms and Classical Approaches 
 
Search theory has played an important role in military operations.  It is within the 
context of agent-based simulation that this study will focus on applications of search 
theory.  Organized search theory and the discipline of operations research were born at 
the same time and indeed share a common lineage, the necessity of securing the survival 
of the allied nations faced with the threat of Nazi Germany during World War II.  The 
passage of time has not changed the need for the military to be involved in search theory; 
if anything, the requirement for continuing research in this area has increased.  McCue 
observes candidly that given recent advances in defense technology, “the operations of 
war are operations of search” (McCue, 1990:168).  A distinction here must be made 
between search and rescue (SAR) efforts and (previously mentioned) offensive search 
operations. 
An excellent survey of search theory literature is available (Benkoski, Monticino, 
and Weisinger, 1991).  For this research, pertinent material addresses the following: 
 
 13
• Emphasize search planning, not search modeling; 
• Take a tactical, not strategic, viewpoint; 
• Assume search involves uncertainty; 
• Aim more at obtaining initial detections, than at fusing multiple detections; 
• Involve a moving target; and 
• Involve a non-cooperative target. (Benkoski, Monticino, and Weisinger, 1991) 
2.3.1 Search and Rescue in World War II. 
 
 The difference between SAR and offensive search operations is best characterized 
by the nature of the target.  By definition, SAR involves a cooperative or neutral target 
(as in the case of a seagoing craft in distress and lacking the means to draw attention).  
The aforementioned survey addresses SAR as well as offensive search.  Ironically, SAR 
had its formalized beginnings in the early 1940’s.  In fact, for the Royal Air Force, SAR 
began as “an improvisation” in World War II (MacMillan, 1950:58). 
 The concept of SAR also involves distress prevention where possible.  Coastal 
Command aircraft would warn allied ships prior to their entering a minefield or running 
aground during thick fog, for example (via signaling or even by firing machine gun bursts 
across the bows of such sea craft) (HBMSO, 1943:114).  Where search was involved, 
history is replete with examples.  Such cases usually began with a request for assistance 
by the vessel itself or by a witness to its distress, and often included defensive air cover 
against hostile forces to enable rescue operations.  Sometimes, as in the case of the 
British submarines “Triad” and “Triumph” as well as the HMS “Kelly,” the vessel was 
towed safely to port.  Other times, as in the cases of the Norwegian vessel “Tropic Sea,” 
the S.S. “Kensington Court,” and the “City of Benares” ocean liner, only the crew and/or 
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passengers were rescued (the latter craft carrying children from Great Britain to Canada; 
46 survivors were rescued) (HBMSO, 1943:115-118).  Many of these rescues were made 
possible by the fact that Coastal Command had “flying boats” in their inventory (i.e., 
Sunderlands as depicted in Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  British Poster Showing a Sunderland Flying Boat (HBMSO, 1943:5) 
 
More often than not, however, aircraft notified allied ships in the vicinity, which 
in turn rescued the survivors.  Early SAR operations were thus, for the most part, reactive 
and involved little in the way of search planning unless the allies knew survivors existed 
and had an idea as to their location. 
2.3.2 Search Possesses Structure of Its Own. 
 
Koopman describes the operation of search as “an organic whole having a 
structure of its own—more than the sum of its parts” (Koopman, 1999:2).  Such language 
is often used to describe agent-based modeling and emergent behavior.  He underscores 
the necessity to study search structure for its real importance and most effective 
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performance, without overemphasizing immediate practical answers to questions 
regarding how to plan a search; “rules without scientific explanation” are to be avoided.  
Credible research is paramount for a discipline used so ubiquitously for such things as 
mineral deposits, police operations, pattern recognition, disease or contamination, 
medical diagnostics, and markets (Koopman, 1999:12-13).  For example, though anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) is conducted differently today than in World War II, search 
techniques used in historical ASW have potential application to these other areas (modern 
anti-submarine warfare tactics mainly involve surveillance around convoys by sonar-
equipped warships, helicopters, and inshore mobile units; that is not to say offensive 
search operations similar to what was used in the Bay of Biscay would not recur, only 
that more modern examples of such tactics are not prevalent) (OASG, 1977:191).  In 
other words, examples of search from World War II are good illustrations in that they are 
available, detailed (in many cases), and can be verified historically. 
2.3.3 Recent Uses of Search. 
 
Search techniques in many areas have changed as technology has grown.  The 
search for mineral deposits, for example, now involves such items as airborne laser-based 
remote sensing systems that “map” an area.  This is accomplished by measuring various 
spectral emissions and thermal properties of a given area through a range of light 
frequencies accounting for atmospheric, altitude, and instrument effects.  Promising 
results have been produced for minerals such as quartz, clay/feldspars, garnet, talc, 
dolomite, and amphibole to name a few (Mortensen, 1996:22-23).  Another example 
involves the search for a relationship between disease risk and potential point sources for 
such diseases.  Utilizing specialized databases and standard statistical techniques such as 
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parametric modeling, researchers can explore a variety of potential correlations between 
certain locations and disease risk (Diggle et. al., 1997).  Professionals in the field of 
economics employ search techniques as well.  Models exist that predict a worker’s 
optimal job search strategy in a particular market as a function of supply, demand, wage 
determination, unemployment durations, etc. (Rauh, 1997:128-153).  Even SAR 
techniques now include such things as satellite involvement and ground station networks 
as a means of relaying distress alert and location information to rescue authorities 
(Cospas-Sarsat, 1998). 
Perhaps one of the more logical extensions of offensive search operations 
involves drug interdiction.  As opposed to flying specialized search patterns in order to 
ambush elusive, non-cooperative targets, authorities place an emphasis on the fusion of a 
number of elements including intelligence information, radar warning networks, military 
aircraft, and specialized interdiction police ground teams.  An example occurred on 
November 18, 1992, when a twin turbo-prop Convair 580 carrying $2.7 billion 
(Canadian) worth of cocaine flew non-stop from Colombia to a deserted airstrip in 
Quebec.  U.S. Customs and the North American Defense Command (NORAD) had it 
under surveillance almost from the moment it took off.  Four CF-18 Canadian fighter jets 
were eventually scrambled to track the aircraft as it neared the Canadian coast, and four 
CH-136 Twin Huey helicopters carrying a Royal Canadian Mounted Police interdiction 
team met the aircraft upon landing and promptly arrested the occupants.  Obviously, the 
key search component in this scenario and for interdiction operations in general, was the 
airspace surveillance radar network (Hughes, 1993:48-51). 
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Broad area searches for arms control treaty violations provide yet another 
example involving an application of offensive search operations.  Since using aerial 
assets (i.e., aircraft or satellites) to search an entire country for illegal military equipment 
is not cost-effective, a suitable alternative might be to employ aerial surveillance based 
upon known search theory principles including prior information about where and for 
what to look.  In 1991, a study sponsored by the United States Congress examined the 
conditions under which aerial monitoring would make a significant contribution to arms 
control verification (U.S. Congress, 1991).  Most of the quantitative analyses documented 
in the congressional report are based upon classical search theory concepts mentioned 
elsewhere in this research effort. 
2.3.4 Concepts Defined—Mathematical Foundation for Search Theory. 
 
For purposes of this paper, the object of interest is the “target,” while the 
“searcher” is concerned with finding the object of interest.  McCue introduces a 
mathematical foundation for search theory by stating that “instantaneous sighting 
probabilities form a sighting potential: potentials integrate to form a lateral range curve, 
whose integral is the sweep width” (McCue, 1990:68). 
The concept of a “lateral range curve” in reference to a specific sensor is a graph 
of the probability of detection (POD) against the perpendicular distance from the sensor 
relative track to the target (which is the same as the object's distance from the sensor to 
the closest point of approach).  Figure 4 is an example lateral range curve. 
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Ideal Search 
Conditions 
Poor Search
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Figure 4.  Sample Lateral Range Curves (Fundamentals of SAR, 2002) 
The “sweep width” is the area underneath the lateral range curve, and is used as a 
measure of search effectiveness of a given sensor (Koopman, 1999:65).  It is easy to 
tabulate, and in fact the National Search and Rescue Manual gives sweep widths for a 
variety of sensors in a variety of environments (NSRC, 2000:App.G).  These tables are 
periodically updated via simulation exercises with the respective sensors (Edwards et. al., 
1980).  Inherent in the concept of “sweep width” is use of the definite range law, the 
basis of which is that no probability exists to detect targets outside the specified range, 
while targets within the specified range are detected with certainty.  The [effective 
search] sweep rate is the mean number of targets detected per unit time (Koopman, 
1999:66). 
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The idea of “exhaustive search” involves complete coverage of an area, and is 
used in many instances as an upper bound on search effectiveness (Washburn, 1989:1-2).  
Questions regarding the smallest amount of track length for complete coverage or the 
largest amount of track length in the search region without overlap can be addressed 
using so-called “raster scan” (lawnmower approach), spiral-in, or spiral-out patterns, 
depending upon the situation.  Classically, exhaustive search assumes that detection is 
certain since early models assumed the target always stayed within the search area.  Such 
an assumption as a matter of course cannot be made in the case of searching for U-boats 
at sea, since the U-boats were known to enter and leave the search area. 
“Random search” as a concept plays a central role in search theory as its use 
places a lower bound on the probability of detection (likened to searching small regions 
of interest as “confetti on the ground”) (Washburn, 1989:2-4).  Since it has been shown to 
follow an exponential distribution (probability of sighting = 1 – e-(search effort/area), the 
cumulative distribution function for an exponential distribution; McCue, 1990:166), 
random search is characterized by the “memoryless property” of that distribution.  This is 
consistent with intuition in that the length of time a searcher has been looking to detect a 
target has no bearing on subsequent detection probability. 
The “inverse cube law” is defined as a reasonable compromise between random 
and exhaustive search (Washburn, 1989:2-5).  The law states that the probability of 
detection by a searcher seeking a target is inversely proportional to the cube of the 
separation distance.  Vision, active radar, and radar detectors are all considered inverse 
cube law search devices.  The “first search curve” listed in the National Search and 
Rescue Manual, from which other curves are derived, is the inverse cube law.  The 
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derivation of the inverse cube law is characterized by four equations, a combination of 
infinite sums and integrals, that can be evaluated in closed form; this fact led Washburn 
to state that the law is “therefore possibly holy” (Washburn, 1989:2-15), and can be used 
even when the underlying assumptions are not directly verifiable.  It is chiefly through 
the use of this law, and Koopman’s forestalling theorem (McCue, 1990:74), that 
expressions for a priori detection and counter-detection probabilities can be derived for 
searchers and targets based upon realistic ranges of the equipment used and the distance 
between searcher and target (such as in a simulation).  Also, the use of this law in the Bay 
of Biscay agent-based simulation forces the empirical results to be bounded by the 
analytical search theory results.  
2.3.5 Regarding Classical Approaches. 
 
Some problems associated with models based solely on geometric analysis are 
that: 
• Using the definite range law in practice can be unrealistic, as search should be 
associated with at least some degree of randomness; 
• Real-world navigation is not perfect (especially when multiple searchers are 
involved; there is a difference between planning and execution); and 
• The target’s intent to evade may lead to unpredictable movement on the part 
of the target (Washburn, 1989:2-1). 
Models based on detection-rates tend to be more robust than geometric models, as 
the events of detection in non-overlapping time intervals are assumed independent.  
Search models also have to strike a balance between efficiency and completeness of 
coverage.  This is perhaps illustrated best through the “circle-packing” concept in which 
 
 21
tightly packed adjacent circles represent search coverage areas; no matter how big the 
circles, there will either be duplication of effort or area that remains unsearched.  
Likewise, when patrolling a channel, how tightly should the searching surface craft turn 
as it proceeds?  There is always this tradeoff to consider (Washburn, 1989:1-4). 
2.3.6 The Role of Computer Simulation in Classical Search Theory. 
 
Koopman agrees that computer simulation has its role, but these roles are largely 
relegated to a minor role in Search and Screening (Koopman, 1999).  Such devices are 
good to the extent that they may “lighten the work,” but he warns that there still exists the 
need for solid underlying mathematics.  Computer simulation should never be used as a 
means to shortcut scientific rigor.  Techniques should be based on “painstaking tactical, 
physical, and mathematical analysis.”  The danger of self-deception in simulation is all 
the more insidious because the concepts are buried in a computer program, sheltered from 
rational criticism (Koopman, 1999:252). 
On the other hand, operations research analysts involved in search theory during 
World War II often used simulation for various purposes.  Some of these uses involved 
evaluating operational measures such as sweep rate, counter-measures, and probability of 
detection curves for a variety of search devices as a function of range to target (Morse 
and Kimball, 1954:38, 98, 134).  In his article on Koopman’s life, Morse even states that 
Kimball utilized simulation “to improve search procedures” (Morse, 1982:421).  In fact, 
one of the advantages of using computer simulation as opposed to other analytical models 
is that simulation allows one to relax mathematical assumptions required for those 
models. 
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2.4 More Modern Approaches to Search Theory 
 
Many types of glimpse models (i.e., models where target detection is attempted in 
discrete “snapshots” in time such as a radar beam sweeping a circular area outside the 
search platform) have been derived using geometric and stochastic methods.  Such 
models, though well established analytically, tend to be highly dependent upon rigid 
assumptions regarding searcher and target movement and position.  Models exist, for 
example, for fleeing targets for which the searcher has obtained a fix at a certain point in 
time (see Ishida and Korf, 1995), areas where a mobile target is known to be uniformly 
located, and stationary (see Zhu and Oommen, 1997) or randomly moving targets (such 
as a lost hiker).  Research has been done to choose optimal search paths upon which to 
allocate search effort in order to find non-cooperative targets; these models assume the 
existence of a network of discrete arcs (see Musman, et. al., 1997, and Hohzaki and Iida, 
2001).  There appears to be a seemingly endless series of problems that must be 
addressed situationally when employing analytical methods.  The solution pattern for 
such problems has classically involved starting with a series of assumptions and deriving 
a sweep width based upon a distribution of effort (Washburn, 1989:1-22). 
Other examples of such search models based on simplifying assumptions include 
multiple targets distributed in the searchable area according to a Poisson distribution.  If 
this assumption is valid, for example, the searcher then knows the sensor is completely 
characterized by its sweep width from the standpoint of search efficiency (Washburn, 
1989:8-4).  Since all directions are equivalent in a Poisson field, for example, it is 
impossible to orient oneself in such a field for search optimization purposes. 
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Stochastic models based on “signal excess” equations, which tend to be 
complicated, involve rigid assumptions about signal behavior.  Most such detection 
models, Washburn concludes, yield little improvement over the definite range law since 
signal excess is so sensitive to range to target that detection probabilities will still either 
be very close to zero or very close to one (as in the case of the definite range law)  
(Washburn, 1989:3-7). 
If the search area can be partitioned into regions, each having some probability of 
containing the target (based upon subject matter expert input), the amount of search effort 
per region can be optimized using Everett’s theorem (constrained optimization) 
(Washburn, 1989:5-2).  One necessary assumption is that the target is stationary within 
one of the regions. 
In what Washburn refers to as “myopic search with discrete looks,” a greedy 
algorithm is employed to optimize the amount of effort applied to the different regions 
comprising a total area of search (Washburn, 1989:5-14).  Again, it is assumed that the 
target is stationary within one of the regions. 
Search problems where a target takes evasive action in order to forestall detection 
(as in anti-submarine warfare) seldom yield to analysis; in such cases simulation is said to 
be a good alternative (Washburn, 1989:2-15).  Another interesting approach to the types 
of problems involving an evading opponent uses minimax strategy (game theory) in order 
to maximize the probability of detection for the searcher (see Dambreville and Le Cadre, 
2001).  A potential complication with this minimax strategy might be that varying 
strategies for multiple searchers and targets could quickly become too computationally 
complex to solve using any methods currently available. 
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Analytical models tend to be complex, the real world even more so.  A littoral 
environment (open ocean) is especially variable in ways not easy to describe. 
It is therefore tempting to describe search capability through experiments 
where the searcher performs a specified maneuver in an attempt at 
detection, rather than trying to discover fundamental parameters of the 
environment and then reasoning deductively.  (Washburn, 1989:4-1) 
 
This is the very idea behind lateral range curves, and hints at the possible utility of using 
simulation. 
2.4.1 The Role of Computer Simulation in Modern Search Theory. 
 
Perhaps the best instance of computer simulation as it relates to search theory is 
the Computer-Assisted Search Planning System (CASP) introduced by the United States 
Coast Guard in 1974.  An overview of CASP is given in Haley and Stone [1980] and in 
Richardson and Discenza [1980].  “CASP has been used at the Air Force Central Rescue 
Headquarters at Scott AFB, Illinois, to help plan and coordinate missions for lost 
airplanes within the continental United States” (Richardson and Discenza, 1980:661).  
This system, based in part on Monte Carlo simulation, was devised specifically for search 
and rescue (i.e., target is stationary or subject to random drifts based on weather and 
littoral currents and is not trying to evade the searcher).  CASP is characterized by a 
probability map display where each search grid square has a probability of target 
location.  Its underlying structure is a markov process with three-dimensional state space 
consisting of variables representing latitude, longitude, and search failure probability.  
CASP generates an initial probability distribution, and updates the display taking into 
account wind and current information, as well as negative and false positive search 
results.  Given the assumptions upon which it is based, namely that it does not account 
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for evading targets or for targets entering and leaving the search area, this system could 
not realistically be applied to the situation addressed in this research effort. 
As an example of a larger modeling effort, the Coast Guard’s Research and 
Development Center is involved in the Maritime Operations Simulation (MarOpsSim), a 
discrete event simulation tool designed to support Coast Guard mission areas and 
acquisition strategies.  Specific work includes SAR research aimed at studying and 
prioritizing “various alternatives and possibilities for improved search planning models, 
technology, tactics, and doctrine” (Downer, 1999).  To date, MarOpsSim has yielded 
promising results in detecting targets consistent with known lateral range curves, 
generalizing detection capability in certain instances, accurately representing SAR 
planning tactics, and accurately analyzing resource and target motion. 
There is also ongoing work in the SAR arena investigating the use of software 
agents interfacing between a CASP-like Coast Guard network server and an ocean 
simulation server.  The result of this research is near real-time projected trajectory 
information of survivor whereabouts upon which the Coast Guard can act (“real-time” 
meaning from the time the Coast Guard receives the call for help; see Wilson, Burroughs, 
Kumar, and Sucharitaves, 2001). 
Another example using Monte Carlo simulation to optimize a search pattern is 
also given in Haley and Stone [1980] where search aircraft seek to detect and identify 
surface targets for surveillance purposes.  Ironically, the only search pattern analyzed (by 
varying measurements of the legs involved) is the heretofore-mentioned crossover barrier 
patrol system used by RAF Coastal Command in World War II. 
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2.4.2 Computer Simulation to Determine Optimum Search Paths. 
 
Washburn warns against preoccupation with discovering search paths that are 
optimal for the searcher as such solutions are rare in search theory (Washburn, 1989:1-1).  
Even if an optimal solution is found, the path might not be easy to follow; in fact, a 
“path” is not a convenient mathematical object at all, he contends.  The object of interest 
is more likely to be a distribution of effort.  Even so, the search and rescue working group 
report produced by Haley and Stone [1980] comments on search pattern analysis.  
Specifically, 
Modern aircraft electronics and microcomputer devices are capable of 
automatic control of aircraft and can be programmed to execute detailed 
flight patterns.  This capability permits more accurate execution of 
existing patterns, but more importantly, gives the opportunity to introduce 
new and unusual search patterns previously disregarded as beyond the 
capabilities of human pilots.  Are there some types of search paths which 
might be more effective for search?  Can a path-by-path optimization 
algorithm be constructed?  Would such an optimization be useful for 
unusual sensor characteristics such as radar, magnetic anomaly detectors 
or emergency locator searches?  Analytical studies should be undertaken  
and any resulting unusual patterns should be exercised in modern aircraft 
under automatic control.  Certain of these unusual search circumstances 
may find pathwise optimization more nearly optimal than standard 
patterns.  (Haley and Stone, 1980:56) 
 
The United States Coast Guard teaches their personnel that choosing an appropriate 
search pattern involves many factors and is highly dependent upon the given scenario 
(Fundamentals of SAR, 2002).  The National Search and Rescue Manual currently lists 
five search pattern types of interest in this research effort.  These are the Parallel, 
Creeping Line, Square, Sector, and Barrier [crossover patrol system] patterns (NSRC, 
2000:App.G).  These patterns will be compared and contrasted with respect to the 
number of U-boats sighted by aircraft within the context of agent-based computer 
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simulation to determine whether or not differences in these value measures exist between 
the patterns considered in the context of the historical case studied herein.  If, as 
Washburn contends, such comparisons are analytically intractable, it stands to reason that 
this type of problem is a candidate for our agent-based simulation approach. 
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III. Methodology 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research is to present a multi-agent simulation, built around 
the allied search for U-boats in the Bay of Biscay during World War II, which extends 
several classic search theory algorithms.  Comparison of techniques is based on the 
effectiveness of finding high-valued, mobile assets.  A JAVA multi-agent simulation 
model was designed, built and tested, and used to demonstrate the existence of differing 
emergent behaviors between search patterns currently used by the United States military.  
This chapter addresses specifics of the study demonstrating the modern search patterns 
used for offensive search operations and the particulars of modeling the historical 
scenario. 
3.2 Search Patterns Defined 
 
Each of the five search patterns from the National Search and Rescue Manual are 
described in more detail.  For each, a figure is provided depicting the pattern and the key 
assumptions are provided.  Each figure includes a commence search pattern (CSP) point. 
When the point of last contact with the target (datum) is not known with a high 
degree of certainty and the search area is large, either the parallel (Figure 5) or the 
creeping line (Figure 6) search is preferable.  The parallel pattern is most desirable when 
the target is equally likely to occupy any part of the search area. 
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Figure 5.  Parallel Search Pattern (Fundamentals of SAR, 2002) 
 
The creeping line pattern, on the other hand, is typically employed when the 
target is more likely to be in one end of the search area than the other. 
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Figure 6.  Creeping Line Search Pattern (Fundamentals of SAR, 2002) 
  
When the point of last contact is well known or established within close limits, 
the square (Figure 7) and sector (Figure 8) search patterns are preferable.  The square 
pattern is used when uniform coverage of the search area is desired, while the sector 
search is used in scenarios where the target is difficult to detect. 
 
 30
CSP
S
S
2S
2S
3S
3S
4S
4S
 
Figure 7.  Square Search Pattern (Fundamentals of SAR, 2002) 
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Figure 8.  Sector Search Pattern (Fundamentals of SAR, 2002) 
 
 Finally, when the target is fast moving or when a strong current is present in the 
search area, the barrier patrol search pattern (Figure 9) is preferred. 
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Figure 9.  Barrier Patrol Search Pattern (Fundamentals of SAR, 2002) 
3.3 Simulation Assumptions 
 
 As previously mentioned, the Bay of Biscay simulation was written in JAVA and 
run on a 2-GHz Pentium 4 PC with 256 MB of RAM running a Windows 2000 operating 
system.  Agent and simulation design data was compiled according to the following 
hierarchy:  1) historical fact as found directly from sources credited to allied and German 
participants; 2) published studies directly related to the offensive search in the bay; 
3) data derived from raw numbers in one or more of the preceding sources; and 4) good 
judgment (operational expertise) when the three previous sources fail or contradict one 
another. 
Within the simulation, “day” is defined as the time between nautical dawn and 
nautical dusk (i.e., the sun is above -12º with respect to the horizon).  Detection sensors 
used by aircraft and U-boats conform to the inverse cube law, and each of the aircraft and 
U-boat agents is independent.  For each iteration, a 12-month warm-up period was used 
followed by six months of data collection.  The six-month period (October, 1942, through 
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March, 1943) used in the scenario was chosen based upon homogeneous use of detection 
devices. 
Initially, 70 U-boats are in place, and replacements enter the Bay from the North 
Atlantic in numbers consistent with history; 32 in October, 27 in November, 11 in 
December, 14 in January, 14 in February, and 25 in March (McCue, 1990).  The U-boats 
start off uniformly distributed in the Bay with half heading to the North Atlantic and half 
heading to their homeport.  Each U-boat is assigned to one of five homeports on the west 
coast of France, the total number of U-boats being distributed evenly among the ports.  
Also, each U-boat leaves port with 30 days of supplies and returns from operations in the 
North Atlantic so as to arrive back in port with no supplies remaining.  U-boats move at 
10 knots surfaced and 2.5 knots submerged and must spend a minimum of 3 hours 
surfaced for each 100 nautical miles (NM) traveled to fully recharge their batteries.  
Refueling at sea is implicitly accomplished by allowing a 0.25 probability of each U-boat 
agent extending time in the North Atlantic by 30 days.  U-boats will submerge 
immediately upon detecting an allied aircraft. 
Forty aircraft operate from Plymouth, England, and will standoff from the coast of 
France to avoid enemy air patrols and escorts.  Also, there is no attrition due to accident 
or anti-aircraft defenses.  Aircraft speed is 120 knots, and each aircraft will fly up to 70% 
of its fuel load or until it has expended its munitions, whichever occurs first.  An aircraft 
can detect a U-boat only when the U-boat is surfaced, and will attack the U-boat upon 
detection, expending its entire payload of munitions.  Maintenance and weather 
cancellations occur before take-off only, and aircraft sortie take-off times are randomly 
scheduled to occur once in a 24-hour period while maintaining a minimum of 12-hours 
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between landing and take-off for each aircraft.  A screenshot of the simulation is included 
below (see Figure 10).  This figure not only shows aircraft and U-boat entities, but also 
coastlines and the area of offensive search operations for the aircraft (the search grid, 
denoted by the large rectangle in the middle of the figure). 
 
Figure 10.  Screenshot of Bay of Biscay Simulation Graphics 
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IV. Results 
 
 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
 This chapter describes the results associated with two scenarios, each having 
different search region sizes.  For both scenarios, aircraft search a 200 x 350 NM2 area, 
hereafter referred to as the search grid.  In the first scenario, the search grid is subdivided 
into 50 x 50 NM2 non-overlapping squares, hereafter referred to as search regions.  At 
least one aircraft per day is assigned to search each region.  In the second scenario, the 
search grid is subdivided into 100 x 100 NM2 overlapping grids; aside from this 
difference, all assumptions mentioned in the previous chapter are valid for both scenarios.  
The search patterns were varied between the five described previously. 
4.2 Scenario One, Non-Overlapping Search Regions 
 
The simulation was run with 20 iterations per search pattern with monthly 
statistics collected on a variety of value measures (see Appendix A).  Simulation output 
was analyzed using the SAS JMP statistical software package. 
Table 1.  Scenario One Means Comparison—All Pairs (20 Iterations) 
Search 
Pattern 
  Mean 
Sightings 
Square A   106.9
Creeping Line A B 98.3
Barrier Patrol  B 96.4
Sector   B 91.9
Parallel   B 91.7
 
For the sake of comparison, simultaneous confidence intervals of the means were 
generated using all search patterns.  The results are shown in Table 1.  Letters in columns 
2 and 3 signify statistical equivalence.  Rows with common letters indicate no statistical 
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difference between search methods.  For instance, the square and barrier patrol patterns 
are statistically equivalent (both have “A”), and barrier patrol and creeping line are 
equivalent (both have “B”).  However, square and creeping line are not equivalent since 
they do not share a common letter. 
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Figure 11.  Scenario One Analysis of Sightings by Pattern (20 Iterations) 
The most important value measure is “U-boat sightings.”  Figure 11 shows a 
graphical representation of simultaneous confidence intervals for each search pattern (the 
JMP software package uses Tukey’s Highly Significant Difference, or HSD, test to 
compare all means).  Simulation output was analyzed at the α = 0.05 level (i.e., a 95% 
simultaneous confidence interval).   
Therefore, according to the model, the two most successful patterns with regard to 
sightings on U-boats are the square pattern and the creeping line pattern.  At this point, it 
was suspected that running the model with a greater number of iterations would reveal 
the square pattern to be the most successful with respect to sightings of U-boats.  Value 
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measures regarding flying hours were also collected for each pattern to determine 
whether or not that measure of effectiveness (MOE) affected the simulation results.  
Quantifying efficiency involves knowledge of both search resources used and the average 
density of target craft (Morse and Kimball, 1954:39).  In fact, the operational sweep rate 
is characterized by the following equation: 
SWEEP RATE =  ______________U-BOAT SIGHTINGS____________ 
(U-BOATS PER SQUARE MILE) x FLYING HOURS 
Next, the simulation was run with 30 iterations per search pattern, only on the two 
patterns found to be most successful with regards to sightings of U-boats and the Barrier 
Patrol pattern, due to its historical significance as having been the pattern actually used in 
the Bay.  Again, monthly statistics were collected on a variety of MOEs (see Appendix 
B), and simulation output was analyzed using the SAS JMP statistical software package.  
Figure 12 shows a graphical representation of simultaneous confidence intervals for each 
search pattern (again, JMP uses Tukey’s HSD test to compare all means). 
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Figure 12.  Scenario One Analysis of Sightings by Pattern (30 Iterations) 
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Simulation output was analyzed once again at the α = 0.05 level (i.e., a 95% 
simultaneous confidence interval).  This data is summarized in Table 2.  As in previous 
tables, rows with common letters indicate no statistical difference between search 
methods. 
Table 2.  Scenario One Means Comparison—All Pairs (30 Iterations) 
Search 
Patterns 
  Mean 
Sightings 
Square A   105.9
Creeping Line   B 97.3
Barrier Patrol   B 91.4
  
Therefore, according to the model, the most successful pattern with regard to 
sightings on U-boats is the square pattern. 
4.3 Scenario Two, Overlapping Search Regions 
 
As previously mentioned, the search grid dimensions remain unchanged between 
scenarios (200 x 350 NM2 ); each of the search regions for scenario two, however, are 
four times the size of the individual search regions for scenario one.  Figure 13 details the 
arrangement of the search regions.  In the figure, the number of each of the 18 search 
regions is placed in the top left corner of the respective region.  The middle regions (2, 5, 
8, 11, 14, and 17) are shown on a separate graph for clarity, but in actuality the two grids 
are superimposed over a single search area. 
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Figure 13.  Scenario Two—Overlapping Search Regions (Separated for Clarity) 
30 iterations of the Bay of Biscay model were run for each of the five search 
patterns to detect potential differences in output MOEs.  The results are displayed in 
Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Scenario Two Analysis of Sightings by Pattern (30 Iterations) 
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Scenario one’s MOEs were again collected for scenario two (see Appendix C).  
“U-boat sightings” is the main value measure used to ascertain differences in search 
patterns.  Simulation output was analyzed using the SAS JMP statistical software 
package (Tukey’s HSD “all means” comparison).  Table 3 shows the results for sightings. 
Table 3.  Scenario Two Means Comparison—All Pairs (30 Iterations) 
Search 
Pattern 
 Mean 
Sightings 
Square A 122.1
Parallel A 121.0
Barrier Patrol A 118.0
Sector A 115.6
Creeping Line A 115.6
 
As is evident from the table, there are no statistical differences between search 
patterns.  This is an expected result, since the effects of structural differences between 
search patterns on MOEs should be minimized when the aircraft routes are allowed to 
overlap. 
The fact that the magnitudes of the mean number of sightings in scenario two are 
at least 10 sightings higher than those of scenario one is a counterintuitive result.  
Actually, scenario two represents a less-efficient search methodology of the search grid 
due to duplication of effort (the aircraft have no knowledge of U-boat routing).  One 
possible explanation for this result stems from the fact that the model does not allow the 
U-boats to modify their transit strategies relative to aircraft activity, other than to 
submerge once they see the aircraft.  Since actual U-boat routes in the model involve 
shortest paths between homeports and their North Atlantic hunting grounds, the 
overlapping search methodology may allow more aircraft access to U-boat routes than the 
non-overlapping search methodology.
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V. Conclusion 
 
 
 
Differing the search patterns used by search aircraft has an effect on the efficiency 
of search operations.  Though this research does not intend to make specific claims as to 
which search pattern is “best” in any general sense, it is worth noting that in the scenario 
with non-overlapping search regions, the square pattern stood out as the one that 
produced the most U-boat sightings in the model.  The creeping line pattern came in 
second, though was only statistically equivalent to the square pattern in the experiment 
characterized by 20 iterations. 
What is perhaps more remarkable is that certain assumptions upon which these 
particular search pattern choices are typically made (by the search and rescue 
community) have been relaxed.  Given that the different runs involve the same number of 
aircraft, allow them to cover the same area, and the aircraft possess no explicit advantage 
with regards to probability of detection, there should be no advantage to using one search 
pattern over another in our model. 
In the scenario where the search regions were allowed to overlap, there were no 
statistical differences between search patterns.  As one observes the model animation and 
attempts to focus on the search grid as a whole (as opposed to individual aircraft), there is 
no discernable pattern evident in the cluster of aircraft as they search for U-boats.  
Ostensibly, a consequence of differing the search patterns should be that inherent 
advantages or disadvantages any one pattern has over any other with respect to U-boat 
sightings are mitigated when the aircraft routes are allowed to overlap.  Therefore, this is 
an expected result. 
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The higher average numbers of U-boat sightings in scenario two relative to 
scenario one are not an expected result.  It is suspected that this is partly due to the non-
reactive behavior of U-boats to aircraft.  Since in scenario two a higher number of aircraft 
have access to the static routes used by the U-boats, the numbers of U-boat sightings 
increase in the midst of this seemingly less-efficient search methodology. 
5.1 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Though this research identified the use of agent-based simulation as a tool for 
revealing emergent behavior in the theory of search, further studies can be done to define 
potential root causes of this behavior.  It would appear from some of the results that the 
patterns that cause aircraft to spend a greater amount of time flying 90 degrees to the 
target track obtain a higher number of target detections.  If that is the case, why then does 
the parallel search pattern perform as well as any other pattern in scenario two?  Is it 
because one or more of the regions allowed a search track to be in such proximity to one 
of the target tracks that an equivalent number of sightings were inevitable?  Only by 
updating the code to display a map to reveal the locations of all sightings could one 
answer that question; the resulting “sighting pattern” analysis might reveal further 
insights. 
The agent-based nature of this model could be further utilized to gain insights into 
agent behavior by allowing agents to react in more complicated ways to other agents in 
the simulation.  Search pattern analysis could then be performed in the presence of such 
behaviors as aircraft and U-boat “flocking” according to some predefined triggers (i.e., 
hard allied intelligence on U-boat locations or U-boats traveling in packs for defensive 
purposes), U-boats attacking aircraft with anti-aircraft guns, certain U-boats designated as 
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refueling boats (whose losses would have an obvious impact on the number of refuelings 
possible in the North Atlantic), U-boats avoiding perceived “danger zones” based upon 
relatively recent sightings and kills of other U-boats, etc.  Cross-referencing could also be 
accomplished using other agent-based software packages to identify emergent behaviors 
and possible root causes.
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Appendix A:  Non-overlapping Scenario Data Tables (20 Iterations) 
 For this and subsequent appendices, “U-boat Sightings” refers to the number of 
U-boats sighted by aircraft while “Aircraft Sightings” refers to the number of aircraft 
sighted by U-boats.  Also, “Time to Cross Bay” refers to the average number of hours it 
takes each U-boat to cross the Bay of Biscay while “Time in the Operational Zone” refers 
to the average number of hours each U-boat spends in the North Atlantic.  
 
Barrier Patrol Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 80 1.67 7,070.93 320.17 238.67 9.69 87.95 589.52
2 80.17 2.67 7,574.33 263.67 198.83 14.37 85.63 593.1
3 92.67 1.33 8,593.82 137.67 239.5 26.38 85.4 568.79
4 101.33 2.17 8,526.80 127.5 242.33 30.65 86.91 591.27
5 154.33 3 8,560.56 109.83 240.67 30.82 89.82 609.47
6 90.33 2.5 8,446.85 138.83 245.17 22.49 89.12 608.79
7 94 2.83 7,916.47 208.5 241 15.68 86.64 632.3
8 93.17 1.67 8,531.68 150.83 251.67 26.96 89.29 600.6
9 94.5 2.33 8,691.86 127.17 231.17 31.23 85.91 625.02
10 97.67 1 8,638.40 120.83 241 31.06 82.96 590.75
11 102.83 1.5 8,535.87 143.33 245.67 32.33 87.77 611.42
12 96.83 2.5 8,903.18 99.17 258.67 34.25 82.13 585.46
13 102.5 2.5 8,636.96 117.67 219.33 32.41 87.05 620.9
14 84.5 1.67 7,656.21 240.5 243.33 13.83 88.11 562.87
15 85 1.83 7,787.33 233 217.67 15.37 80.37 606.24
16 89.5 1.67 8,195.57 171.33 226.67 26.41 85.05 601.23
17 89.67 1 8,357.78 151.17 233 23.41 87.53 600.32
18 91.33 1.67 8,661.16 121.17 224.67 27.37 83.39 585.19
19 118.5 2.17 8,734.02 107.17 253.17 30.6 89.02 607.78
20 88.67 1.67 8,199.88 182 245.33 19.23 87.85 600.39
Mean 96.37 1.97 8,310.98 163.58 236.88 24.73 86.39 599.57
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Parallel Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 72.5 0.5 7,104.99 313.5 208.67 9.73 87.97 597.14
2 79.17 2.17 7,559.05 270.17 195.33 14.97 85.6 607.04
3 90.83 2.5 8,655.50 137.17 228.83 27.7 85.79 604.89
4 97 2.33 8,529.41 133.33 226 29.64 87.67 579.07
5 91.5 1.33 8,787.34 119.17 226.83 31.94 85.79 619.37
6 96.5 1.33 8,696.69 111.17 221.83 32.36 88.33 642.01
7 106.17 1.67 7,665.07 238.83 233.83 10.52 90.84 604.17
8 88.33 1.17 7,767.50 236.83 217.67 14.89 85.07 588.78
9 87.67 1.83 8,354.35 160.67 232.17 25.32 85.09 595.96
10 102.33 2.33 8,673.24 116.67 258.33 31.56 85.59 597
11 95.17 2 8,530.82 140.67 237.5 30.2 86.43 591.62
12 104.17 1.17 8,855.88 102.83 245.67 31.45 84.47 624.83
13 97.5 2.67 8,658.87 115 230.5 31.14 92.19 589.93
14 93.67 3.33 8,835.23 103 217 31.89 90.48 643.74
15 100.17 2.83 8,856.91 96.17 249.83 30.02 86.7 598.01
16 78.5 2 7,674.57 250.33 215.17 16.61 87.2 593.68
17 89.33 0.83 8,069.84 203.83 223.17 16.68 84.63 585.31
18 78.17 2.17 7,870.41 224.67 234.33 10.79 87.64 583.23
19 85.33 2.5 8,099.28 201.83 215.17 14.96 86.72 592.66
20 99.33 2.67 8,613.98 135 244.67 27.75 86.17 604.07
Mean 91.67 1.97 8,292.95 170.54 228.12 23.51 87.02 602.13
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Creeping Line Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 81.17 1.33 7,170.53 312.17 229.67 9.81 87.96 591.09
2 88.33 2.17 7,584.97 268 210.17 13.86 86.59 592.72
3 102.67 1.5 8,522.14 151.33 265.33 26.29 87.58 562.35
4 108.33 1.67 8,560.42 124.17 245.5 29.6 86.49 617.52
5 102.67 1.67 8,820.51 113.83 237.5 31.73 82.88 602.47
6 103.5 2.33 8,743.01 112.17 256.67 31.98 87.48 622.61
7 92.5 1.17 7,820.41 223.5 228.5 12.87 87.84 599.07
8 84.83 2.33 7,929.04 230.67 203.5 16.35 84.89 607.63
9 96.5 2.17 8,347.95 163.33 240.17 26.33 86.83 599.13
10 93.33 2.17 8,695.98 125.5 223.33 31.47 87.17 584.41
11 93.17 1.83 8,596.19 138.67 221.83 30.91 87.1 622.88
12 106 2.33 8,765.72 112 228.67 30.96 87.17 555.9
13 95.5 3.17 8,685.07 123.83 237 32 84.43 599.11
14 114.5 2.67 8,863.49 105.5 246.83 32.44 89.07 590.99
15 115.67 2.5 8,841.06 102.17 263.17 32.86 94.08 570.44
16 95.17 2.5 7,691.47 251.5 208.33 17.35 88.76 579.38
17 89 0.83 7,807.45 230.83 260.5 10.72 89.44 602.09
18 95.83 2.33 8,007.87 207 237.17 15.25 82.48 595.32
19 100.83 1.33 8,633.80 137.67 251.33 26.3 87.84 593.68
20 106 2.67 8,711.48 113.67 238.17 30.78 85.89 585.55
Mean 98.28 2.03 8,339.93 167.38 236.67 24.49 87.1 593.72
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Square Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 80 1.5 7,130.64 316.67 254.5 9.76 87.98 597.92
2 92.33 3 7,622.49 265.33 214.5 13.65 84.93 609.86
3 104.83 2.5 8,649.26 143 253.33 27.5 88.65 613.61
4 100.67 2.67 8,673.18 119.67 227.83 29.66 85.79 614.31
5 112 2 8,786.42 113.67 228.33 30.67 90.2 606.93
6 115.83 2.67 8,773.41 103.67 239.17 29.9 86.3 624.31
7 108.83 2 8,086.92 193.17 263.5 17.69 89.03 630.35
8 99.5 2.5 8,326.73 175.17 231 23.79 89.72 621.95
9 100.83 3.33 8,570.65 139.67 242.83 29.32 89.16 565.92
10 110.67 1.5 8,742.46 111.83 244.5 31.26 85.48 602.09
11 108.33 2.33 8,638.72 139.83 239.17 28.21 92.19 607.18
12 111 2 8,027.93 200.83 255.17 17.45 91.05 614.06
13 92.17 2 7,432.31 284 210.83 14.79 82.88 628
14 112 2.5 8,383.06 162.17 247.17 24.94 90.17 603.54
15 111.17 1.5 8,262.84 183.17 253.17 20.57 88.55 595.45
16 106.33 2.67 8,389.80 159.17 253.33 25.48 88.09 587.8
17 111.67 3 8,783.97 114.67 246.83 30.32 91.63 624.65
18 126 2.17 8,828.93 101.5 255.5 29.86 86.32 595.53
19 115.67 3.83 8,914.36 99.5 266.67 29.69 83.39 631.21
20 117.67 1.83 8,994.52 93.83 263.33 27.47 87.16 619.25
Mean 106.87 2.38 8,400.93 161.02 244.53 24.6 87.93 609.7
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Sector Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 64 1.33 7,178.67 315.33 211.17 9.83 88.08 599.41
2 84.5 2.33 7,585.11 263.83 226.17 13.84 86.73 616.28
3 88.5 1.67 8,592.45 143.83 270.33 25.98 88.82 600.52
4 66.33 1.33 7,502.50 265.67 229.5 10.26 88.53 613.86
5 97.17 2 8,043.81 209.33 261.5 14.87 86.96 595.16
6 90.83 2.33 8,516.47 153.5 235.17 25.11 84.47 618.9
7 97.67 2 8,792.71 110.33 243.67 31.16 86.2 622.95
8 95.67 2.17 8,673.02 124 249 31.24 83.96 584.95
9 101.33 1.83 8,623.13 131.5 236 27.3 89.21 595.86
10 88.67 1 8,220.66 180 266 21.48 87.8 596.4
11 94.33 1.83 8,022.98 212.17 241.67 23.98 88.93 586.56
12 98 2.33 8,676.99 118 231 29.29 87.14 588.55
13 102.5 3.17 8,615.36 128.83 245 31.91 93.95 590.22
14 103 4.33 8,788.61 120 230.5 30.67 91.53 626.22
15 94.67 1.5 8,493.03 154.33 252.17 26.4 88.88 551.1
16 82.67 1.33 8,037.06 214 228.17 21.85 84.65 589.55
17 101.67 1.67 8,778.86 112.67 264.5 29.93 88.11 601.13
18 94.33 2.33 8,924.41 99 234.33 33 87.27 610.2
19 92.5 2.67 8,840.61 103.33 243.67 32.08 89.61 614.97
20 98.67 1.83 8,859.77 101.5 241 31.41 89.64 593
Mean 91.85 2.05 8,388.31 163.06 242.03 25.08 88.02 599.79
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Appendix B:  Non-overlapping Scenario Data Tables (30 Iterations) 
 
Barrier Patrol Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 77.17 1.33 7,124.51 316.83 226 9.75 87.97 583.21
2 86.67 1.67 7,535.58 276.67 247.83 13.71 86.53 568.21
3 88.5 1.67 8,534.08 154.67 225.5 25.32 85.93 620.81
4 98.83 2.33 8,566.77 133.33 251 30.37 91.17 574.57
5 106.33 1.33 8,809.96 111.83 253.67 31.97 86.07 599.12
6 102.67 3 8,770.49 107.17 247.33 31.29 88.09 619.82
7 107 2 8,853.46 95.33 258 32.82 88.46 595.86
8 96.5 2.67 8,814.57 112.33 219.83 33.91 87.69 611.63
9 105.33 3 8,848.22 104.33 248.17 31.25 89.38 603.69
10 76.17 2 7,652.94 247 243.67 14.52 87.38 586.25
11 80.33 1.5 7,299.22 299.33 226.67 13.25 85.18 617.6
12 90 1.83 8,511.87 154.17 234.83 25.5 87.05 605.23
13 89.5 2.17 8,402.58 156 235.83 29.16 82.48 581.01
14 97.17 1.67 8,746.72 124.67 233.83 30.47 83.71 600.96
15 72.17 0.5 7,773.27 248 250.17 14.07 88.37 589.4
16 74.5 2.33 7,554.38 266.33 198.83 15.41 86.53 627.27
17 95.5 1.83 8,574.74 138.17 252.83 27.36 86.42 580.33
18 92.5 1.83 8,760.63 112.5 238.33 31.7 89.77 601.01
19 87.17 3.17 8,091.66 196.5 226.33 16.53 85.58 576.68
20 86.83 1.67 8,208.03 187.17 218 19.95 86.69 622.87
21 97.83 1.83 8,365.44 165.67 243.33 27.06 91.48 620.96
22 98.33 2.83 8,719.76 112.17 250.5 30.38 88 637.6
23 94.5 2 8,370.16 160.67 234.67 19.19 87.2 597.78
24 99.33 2.17 8,730.64 126.33 265.67 25.43 87.73 641.57
25 89.5 1.67 8,499.94 158.5 244.67 27.16 87.07 589.44
26 89.67 2.5 7,824.41 237 231.17 15.3 84.28 586.9
27 90.33 2.83 8,575.41 139.83 242.67 26.31 83.31 590.84
28 102.83 2 8,757.91 118 256.33 30.57 89.5 600.64
29 100.33 1.33 8,727.82 112.5 262 32.28 90.92 591.62
30 67.17 1.83 7,463.87 276.33 231.17 10.73 87.85 596.2
Mean 91.36 2.02 8,315.63 171.64 239.96 24.09 87.26 600.64
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Creeping Line Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 72 1.67 7,084.80 321.67 212 9.71 89.39 598.74
2 96.33 2.5 7,588.94 269.17 224 14.36 84.31 582.75
3 95.5 1.67 8,699.51 141.33 227 27.5 86.53 569.27
4 92.17 2.67 8,685.79 120.5 238 31.46 89.33 590.31
5 119.67 2.17 8,701.63 114.17 266.83 29.58 89.03 586.7
6 97 2 8,805.38 104.5 212.33 33.13 85.44 595.6
7 107.17 1.83 8,737.88 104.17 245.83 27.93 84.85 578.6
8 105.83 3.17 8,811.72 105.67 241.67 29.09 87.43 583.19
9 96.83 3.33 8,829.27 105.67 219.33 31.27 85.28 602.35
10 114.5 2.67 8,796.37 99.83 267 31.92 88.2 606.24
11 72.67 0.67 7,344.14 306 194.83 12.91 88.64 582.26
12 96.17 2.17 7,971.93 215.17 222.33 17.28 87.62 584.92
13 84 2.83 8,334.26 169.67 210.5 26.72 83.39 568.21
14 99.67 2.83 8,656.02 119.33 232 30.77 89.06 616.98
15 105.33 2.17 8,746.63 107.5 239.33 31.95 88.64 591.58
16 81.83 2.67 7,564.67 268.5 214 15.41 90.84 572.86
17 107.33 1.33 8,243.51 171.5 253.33 19.19 87.93 612.66
18 106.67 1.5 8,844.08 118.67 267.67 28.85 89.27 580.54
19 92.67 2.17 8,624.78 138.17 234.5 22.94 86.79 605.47
20 93.67 2.5 8,191.33 183 220.5 19.36 84.74 594.27
21 101.67 2.33 8,461.01 157.33 233.33 28.47 85.79 592.21
22 104.17 3 8,800.89 113 241.17 32.44 84.36 601.63
23 97.5 3.17 8,788.26 100.33 241.5 32.62 85.98 615.4
24 93.33 1.33 8,058.61 200 257 13.25 88.75 584.17
25 95 1.33 7,831.93 231.5 219.83 16.9 87.87 590.17
26 90.17 3 8,527.89 143.5 229.17 26.77 89.05 598.34
27 124 3.33 8,676.22 112.83 265 30.2 86.51 593.9
28 88.83 2 7,799.52 241.83 257.67 11.71 88.68 576.17
29 90.83 2.33 7,916.89 220.33 239.33 15.81 88.19 636.37
30 96.33 2 8,439.62 161.33 225 26.73 87.22 568.32
Mean 97.29 2.28 8,352.11 165.54 235.07 24.21 87.3 592.01
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Square Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 81.5 1 7,108.86 321 245.5 9.73 88.01 607.06
2 78.33 2.33 7,588.70 276 187.67 14.13 83.6 607.57
3 101.33 2.83 8,657.69 133.83 259 27.46 90.13 618.88
4 118.67 2.33 8,602.42 130.5 249.5 30.95 90.47 606.78
5 119.67 2 8,759.80 109.67 262.83 31.31 88.21 586.86
6 111.17 2.5 8,987.82 96.5 237.67 33.68 88.42 583.29
7 114.5 3.5 8,868.95 95.33 225.33 32.7 85.1 630.19
8 129.83 2.67 8,841.47 103.83 275 30.29 89.63 583.19
9 136 4.83 8,691.57 116.33 267.5 32.9 90.17 626.97
10 133.83 2.17 8,802.31 90.17 268.33 31.02 86.57 571.62
11 81.83 1.67 7,059.65 336 229.83 9.95 88.58 589.17
12 108.5 2.5 7,817.67 220 255.17 15.14 88.86 596.75
13 98.5 3.33 8,208.46 189 225.33 25.05 86.23 594.12
14 111.17 2.83 8,640 125.67 257.83 29.56 86.63 590.9
15 108.33 2 8,621.09 117 243.33 30.12 87.66 585.03
16 87.17 1.83 7,336.05 289 242.5 11.8 87.29 589.85
17 104.33 2.83 8,049.20 190.5 231.83 16.83 87.99 577.74
18 121.33 2.83 8,690.23 119 263.5 27.88 89.08 592.99
19 96 1.83 7,797.35 241.33 263.67 10.7 87.55 576.51
20 99.17 1.67 8,083.86 202.5 251.83 15.7 86.41 586.61
21 96.83 3.67 8,266.37 172.83 241.5 27.19 85.45 584.01
22 118.33 1.83 8,635.96 113.67 242.5 28.47 85.72 596.7
23 112.33 2.5 8,881.26 101.33 259.33 32.39 86.57 610.39
24 105.17 2 8,527.77 150.83 274.67 20.39 87.92 607.63
25 99 3.17 8,310 175.33 208.5 24.93 86.27 602.4
26 105.67 4.17 8,668.33 127.17 271.17 28.38 87.84 588.23
27 99.33 2.5 8,173.83 190.17 232.67 18.92 87.95 624.89
28 106.33 2.17 8,310.63 168.5 233.67 21.05 88.76 619.25
29 111 2.5 8,735.84 118.5 246.83 29.58 86.24 575.29
30 80.5 1.67 7,396.56 280.83 214.83 10.94 90.48 604.28
Mean 105.86 2.52 8,303.99 170.08 245.63 23.64 87.66 597.17
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Appendix C:  Overlapping Scenario Data Tables (30 Iterations) 
 
Barrier Patrol Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 94.83 1.5 7,121.26 318.33 276.5 9.76 89.3 583.78
2 110.67 2.83 7,529.88 270.33 255.67 14.08 84.64 595.84
3 118.83 4 8,638.48 135.17 289.83 26.77 85.65 596.67
4 102.17 3.17 7,477.64 263.83 301.83 10.93 90.22 591.75
5 130.67 2 8,029.57 199.33 278.67 17.79 89.62 601.66
6 126.83 3 8,595.92 131.17 311.5 27.36 84.74 596.52
7 114.33 2.83 7,881.68 219.67 291.17 13.87 87.42 624.45
8 98.17 2.83 8,123.47 204.5 234.5 19.48 85.3 617.82
9 128.67 3.17 8,605.98 143 321.83 27.71 84.98 603.93
10 104.83 2.17 7,937.74 211.67 295.5 15.5 88.31 595.58
11 111.83 1.67 7,695.59 254.67 250 18.25 83.45 603.94
12 117.83 2 7,856.54 227.67 315.17 14.07 86.99 592.84
13 113.83 2.17 7,594.63 253.33 272.17 19.18 86.85 599.87
14 116.67 4.67 8,575.55 136.33 281.67 28.51 85.67 614.48
15 133.5 2.83 7,661.77 250.83 257.83 12.52 89.76 618.44
16 114.67 2.83 7,559.99 257.17 277.67 17.08 87.99 577.94
17 114.17 2.33 8,681.82 128.17 297.17 28.74 90.78 594.24
18 180.17 4 8,605.80 113.17 298.5 28.7 90 589.63
19 103.5 2.17 7,855.48 231.17 289 12.94 89.17 620.18
20 108.83 2.17 8,118.88 187 261.33 17.92 83.16 620.04
21 110.67 2.83 8,256.91 172.17 293.83 26.82 84.47 579.85
22 133.5 3.67 8,799.02 114.83 315.33 28.38 89.33 609.18
23 123 3.33 8,797.57 107.83 294.17 28.28 87.7 621.93
24 125.17 3 8,771.41 99.33 288.67 32.53 86.1 603.09
25 124.67 3.33 8,661.27 114.17 274.67 29.4 87.21 594.21
26 105.5 2 7,868.84 216 298.33 13.03 87.44 593.71
27 114.83 2.67 7,951.73 206 272.83 15.51 89 610.32
28 119.17 3 8,544.27 136 323.5 27.5 90.76 583.82
29 127.5 2.17 8,696.61 121.83 308.17 30.52 87.48 644
30 111.17 3 7,883.78 233.83 278 16.27 88.12 589
Mean 118.01 2.78 8,145.97 188.62 286.83 20.98 87.39 602.29
 
 52
Parallel Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 104.83 2 7,135.42 313.5 269.17 9.76 87.54 585.98
2 109.83 2.83 7,260.36 295.5 260.33 10.86 87.68 597.58
3 123.67 2.67 7,964.13 216.83 262.17 14.52 86.64 594.11
4 128.33 3.17 8,422.69 158 282.33 26.85 88.92 579.01
5 115.67 2.17 7,791.97 240.33 307.67 10.7 87.45 574.74
6 112 2.67 7,933.85 217.17 253 14.95 84.39 587.39
7 126.5 2.5 8,541 135.5 269.83 26.86 84.15 598.44
8 126.33 4 8,526.51 143.67 265 27.47 82.59 588.25
9 122.17 2.5 8,125.18 188.5 267.83 21.98 87.83 617.11
10 117.5 2.83 7,716.61 237.67 300.67 11.07 90.07 597.22
11 109.33 2.33 7,507.34 284.17 248.67 15.45 88.92 565.61
12 139.17 2.17 8,599.88 138.67 314 27.72 91.22 582.86
13 125.83 2.33 6,966.95 333 259.17 9.72 91.72 571.94
14 110.17 3.5 7,818.31 232.17 245.67 15.28 86.72 590.91
15 126.17 3 8,419.68 151.5 268.5 26.16 85.32 652.76
16 127 2.83 8,550.72 138.17 252 30.89 87.68 609.99
17 115.67 2.17 7,848.29 217.67 298.83 11.81 88.76 618.48
18 122.17 3.5 8,063.57 203.83 264 15.89 86.21 645.21
19 129.17 3.17 8,536.23 135.5 277.17 27.76 85.87 578.49
20 126 2.33 8,828.93 108.17 265 31.28 85.87 604.4
21 127.67 2.5 8,409.09 149 258.67 27.97 85.53 606.78
22 124.33 2.33 7,906.75 212.67 255 15.61 82.33 593.88
23 105.5 2.33 7,940.17 224.33 286.17 11.91 87.54 627.5
24 122.33 3.33 8,331.62 174 264.17 16.15 84.16 595.54
25 125.17 2.33 8,449.27 153.33 281.5 28.1 85.88 594.82
26 123.83 3.17 8,820.40 118.33 272.5 31.54 83.64 621.09
27 126.67 3.17 8,030.34 202.17 315.17 15.54 87.52 577.74
28 119.33 3.17 8,024.61 205.33 262.5 16.31 87.15 617.12
29 133.67 2.67 8,555.87 135.67 285 27.41 89.97 605.43
30 103.17 1.83 7,563.97 267 261.67 12.07 89.99 611.94
Mean 120.97 2.72 8,086.32 197.71 272.44 19.65 86.98 599.74
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Creeping Line Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 86.67 2.33 7,185.09 320.83 257 9.83 90.57 583.95
2 93.67 2.67 7,415.93 290.17 271.17 10.63 87.58 613.39
3 103.83 3 8,000.01 219.5 255.5 15.75 86.51 618.52
4 111.83 3.17 8,428.31 157.17 263 26.53 87.38 633.76
5 101.83 1.5 7,806.22 241.33 307 10.97 90.58 623.26
6 116.83 1.67 7,969.29 217.5 287.17 15.24 86.06 592.32
7 113.33 3 8,615.98 130.33 277.33 26.6 84.58 587.97
8 124 2.67 8,801.45 119.5 288.67 30.28 88.32 632.14
9 106.83 3 7,902.92 234.67 287.17 14.69 87.75 620.86
10 106.67 1.83 8,142.18 186 268 19.54 82.18 604.6
11 97 1.5 7,051.88 329.83 299.17 10.48 90.31 566.54
12 148 2.17 7,932.38 214.83 265 15.18 90.87 612.76
13 121.67 2.17 8,258.44 185.33 286.33 26.75 83.49 582.64
14 113.33 2 7,921.82 222.5 303.67 16.19 86.4 582.57
15 116.17 2.5 7,860.74 240.17 295.67 14.59 84.76 597.9
16 108 2.67 8,339.68 173.83 261.83 26.74 85.78 585.55
17 129.17 2.33 8,788.44 112.33 307.5 31.72 89.57 605.89
18 131.17 2.33 7,790.87 223.83 293.67 11.43 90.9 608.48
19 116.5 2.33 8,056.41 208.17 280.17 16.05 90.23 588.5
20 132.83 2.33 8,622.31 133.17 295.17 27.39 91.13 596.2
21 116.5 3 8,557.64 147 281 30.38 84.84 596.25
22 128.83 2.67 8,869.27 104.17 304.5 30.7 83.57 590.78
23 109.5 1.83 7,931.82 219 312.33 11.96 88.12 560.5
24 120.17 2 8,287.08 176.83 300.5 15.98 84.14 621.33
25 113 2.67 8,568.79 145.83 277 26.82 84.06 595.67
26 123.17 3 8,784.17 119.17 293.17 30.36 84.16 590.04
27 136.83 4 8,812.35 102.5 318.5 30.64 85.35 616.24
28 120.83 2.5 8,624.19 130.33 290.5 25.19 88.91 577.6
29 128.67 2.67 8,416.36 152.33 310.5 25.73 86.06 578.46
30 90.5 2 7,569.61 276.67 261 11.18 87.71 616.65
Mean 115.58 2.45 8,177.05 191.16 286.64 20.52 87.06 599.38
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Square Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 103.83 1.33 7,088.41 322 297.17 9.71 90.53 602.16
2 125 4 7,514.69 266.17 272.5 14.05 88.29 585.73
3 120.17 2 8,698.86 141.33 301.5 28.27 86.83 625.36
4 128.5 3 8,649.14 120.17 288.67 30.01 84.92 610.15
5 148 3.67 8,732.17 112.17 313.83 28.36 87.51 564.24
6 112.33 2 7,768.36 232 327.33 11.87 87.26 579.03
7 122 2.33 7,951.81 203.17 292.33 15.9 84.72 611.18
8 129.83 2 8,523.72 139.83 340.33 27.91 85.09 582.36
9 110.5 2.67 7,739.57 245.33 290.5 14.9 88.19 603.54
10 122.67 1.5 8,095.78 196 279.5 19.3 88.05 603.25
11 114 1.33 8,290.64 179.17 294.67 27.31 84.72 569.43
12 127.33 4.67 8,799.04 114.67 289.33 30.29 82.62 597.02
13 108.5 2.17 7,051.01 327.5 282.67 10.46 85.83 604.88
14 118.5 3.33 7,844.98 240.17 280.33 15.22 86.6 598.42
15 130.33 3.33 8,505.84 140.17 314.5 27.74 87.57 571.53
16 133.17 2.17 8,570.66 142.17 304.67 29.32 89.71 562.1
17 117 2 7,813.82 229.33 338.83 10.72 89.77 615.25
18 109 2.5 8,069.99 206.17 256.17 14.23 88.4 622.43
19 123.5 2.83 8,640.89 135.5 297.17 26.63 87.93 600.22
20 138.67 1.67 8,792.14 111.17 316.17 29.24 88.04 611.98
21 102 1.17 7,509.02 272 289.33 13.32 87.82 593.72
22 131.83 2.5 8,114.93 198.17 308.83 17.76 85.57 593.98
23 138 2 8,575.78 126.67 322.33 27.13 86.08 600.77
24 115.5 2.67 8,102.39 197 317.5 12.01 87.95 576.98
25 116.5 1.83 7,635.64 255.5 281.83 12.87 85.96 591.24
26 130.17 1.67 8,526.56 148.5 335.17 27.33 87.39 603.93
27 138.67 3.33 8,777.14 104.17 316.83 31.72 89.26 617.89
28 113.17 2.5 7,914.20 216.17 306.67 14.91 87.7 609.66
29 116.5 2.33 8,075.84 194.33 283 20.61 84.88 602.18
30 117 1.5 7,637.63 255.83 289.5 14.16 88.63 592.37
Mean 122.07 2.4 8,133.69 192.42 300.97 20.44 87.13 596.77
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Sector Pattern Output (Mean Per Month) 
Rep | 
U-boat 
Sightings
U-boats 
Killed 
Aircraft
Sortie 
Hours 
Sorties
Cancelled
Aircraft
Sightings
Aircraft
Over
Bay 
Time 
to 
Cross 
Bay 
Time in
the 
Operation
Zone 
1 95 1.17 7,210.70 313.83 271.67 9.87 89 583.56
2 119.17 2.33 7,627.79 262.67 279 14.65 84.74 582.46
3 115 3.5 8,713.15 137.67 290 25.96 87.93 602.35
4 167.67 4 8,362.10 153.33 302.67 25.12 91.49 579.37
5 116.33 2 8,131.41 201.67 268.67 17.03 82.65 593.84
6 119.17 3.5 8,681.76 130.33 288 28.21 85.56 614.19
7 113.83 2.5 7,897.68 208.17 312.17 15.07 87.76 580.95
8 115 2.83 8,050.84 205.5 282 18.65 85.95 595.83
9 116.17 3.33 8,647.79 135.33 299.5 27.51 90.92 619.96
10 125.83 3.33 8,490.68 151.83 300.33 21.67 89.91 609.61
11 116.5 3 8,056.61 209.33 279 20.67 88.07 613.69
12 113.67 2.83 7,925.99 220 326.17 14.32 87.71 570.34
13 103.83 3.83 7,504.02 283.33 238.17 15.14 84.33 593.94
14 106.5 2.5 7,806.23 256.83 283.17 11.84 87.51 601.94
15 113.83 2.67 7,938.16 218.33 262.83 16.04 86.88 598.53
16 121 2.83 8,343.42 170.83 285 25.4 87.78 611.57
17 135.17 2.5 8,755.85 119.33 304.83 28.97 88.43 624.94
18 119.67 2.17 7,890.46 224.5 336.5 11.9 88.37 588.64
19 111.17 2.5 8,190.46 200.33 264 16.26 82.36 575.93
20 109.17 1.67 7,841.10 240.83 303.83 10.75 87.09 609.28
21 107.17 2.67 7,626.34 266.17 247.67 14.8 82.8 573.48
22 104.33 3.5 7,893.19 234.17 299.33 12.24 86.4 607.47
23 103.17 1.5 7,920.27 231.67 307.17 11.07 87.42 592.27
24 114.33 2.83 8,159.63 194 291.17 12.72 83.72 586.35
25 110.33 2 7,670.39 250 267.33 14.83 85.09 597.32
26 119.83 3.67 8,271.18 196.83 266.67 19.36 88.13 602.23
27 125.83 3.17 8,542.21 146 293.83 27.92 90.55 605.91
28 126.83 2 8,723.85 121.17 286.17 29.71 87.61 594
29 100.17 2.67 7,672.63 255 285.83 11.92 87.36 583.92
30 102.17 2.33 7,756.27 249.67 255.83 13.62 85.58 610.1
Mean 115.59 2.71 8,076.74 206.29 285.95 18.11 86.97 596.8
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